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1. Introduction
In the post-war economic history of West Germany, there have been
two periods of significant unemployment. If we take full employ-
ment to mean a jobless rate of less than 3%, the two periods can
be dated as 1948 to 1958 and 1975 to the present. While the latter
period has naturally been subject to extensive economic research
and a passionate policy debate, the earlier one has long since
been left as a playground for historians with their legitimate
emphasis on fact-gathering and hindsight interpretation. In this
paper, we shall take an economist's look at this first period of
unemployment, i.e. we do not present - as historians would do - a
rich menu of figures and documents which could have a chance of
adding up to a complete historical picture; we rather select a
bunch of descriptive statistical measures and contemporaneous aca-
demic analyses which yield a plausible economic explanation of the
causes of and the remedies for the unemployment problem of the
time.
In detail, we proceed as follows. In Part 2, we give a brief quan-
titative outline of the level and the structure of West German
unemployment in the fifties. In Part 3, we present the diagnosis
of unemployment on which there was almost general agreement at the
time and which still has much appeal today. While there was virtu-
al consensus on the causes of unemployment, there was sharp dis-
agreement on the remedies to be applied. In Part 4, we therefore
present the most important paradigmatic views on economic policy
as they appeared in the academic debate right at the time when
unemployment reached its peak. In Part 5, we finally take a brief
look at the path of economic policy which was actually pursued.
2. A Quantitative Profile of Unemployment in West Germany 1948-58
Table 1 shows the development of the West German unemployment rate
in the first decade after the currency reform. In June 1948 the
rate was 3.2 %, lower than in any subsequent year until 1958.- 2 -

















































*For 6/48 and 12/49 measured at the end of the month; for
1950-85 annual averages; from 6/48 to 1958 excluding,
from 1975 to 1985 including Saarland and Berlin.
Source: own calculations with data from Bundesministerium
fur Arbeit (since 1953: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit),
Jahreszahlen zur Arbeitsstatistik, various issues;
Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik,
various issues.
Table 2: Measures of Interregional Dispersion of Unemployment























































•Calculated as weighted mean (weighted standard deviation) with the
share of a state's labour force in West Germany as weight; from
6/48 to 1958 excluding, from 1975 to 1980 including Saarland and
Berlin.
Calculations Source: own calculations with data from Bundesmini-
sterium fur Arbeit (since 1953: Bundesanstalt
fur Arbeit), Jahreszahlen zur Arbeitsstati-
stik, various issues.- 3 -
Within the eighteen months following the currency reform and the
accompanying liberalisation measures, the rate jumped up to 10.3 %
in December 1949. From its peak in the winter of 1949/1950 - actu-
ally reached in March 1950 at 12.2 % - the rate gradually declined
to an annual average of 3.4 % in 1957 and - after a slight in-
crease in 1958 - below 3 %, where it stayed until 1975. By most
historical standards, this decline of unemployment was rapid and
smooth although, within the trend, periods of accelerated decline
(1950-51, 1952-53, 1954-56) and periods of decelerated decline
(1951-52, 1953-54) can still be easily recognized. A similar pic-
ture emerges from the development of the ratio of unemployment per
vacancy: extremely low at the time of the currency reform, it mov-
ed up to a peak in the winter of 1949/50 and later gradually de-
clined until it reached a low in 1957. The ratio displays about
the same pattern of accelerated and decelerated decline as the
unemployment rate.
A casual glance at the labour statistics of the fifties reveals
that, among all standard structural categories like region, occu-
pation, age and sex, it is the region which dominates as a deter-
minant of unemployment. Table 2 presents some simple measures of
interregional dispersion of unemployment with data disaggregated
by states. The coefficient of variation turns out to be much high-
er in 1950, 1954 and 1958 (above 0.45) than at more recent times
(below 0.30), thus indicating that, relative to the level of unem-
ployment, the regional differences were much more severe in the
fifties than in the seventies or eighties; although a more pro-
nounced regional component is reappearing in the most recent years
- the coefficient of variation rises from 0.15 in 1975 to 0.27 in
1985 - it still does not reach the quantitative dimension of the
fifties. Within the fifties, there was a tendency towards an
equalisation of the unemployment rate - the coefficient of varia-
tion declines from 0.58 in 1950 to 0.46 in 1958 - with the brunt
of the adjustment apparently falling into the first half of the
period. The interstate range of the unemployment rate by and large
supports these conjectures: in the fifties, the maximum state un-
employment rate - the one of Schleswig-Holstein - moved down from- 4 -
25.2 % in 1950 to 6.3 % in 1958, the lowest - the one of Baden-
Wiirttemberg - from 4.3 % in 1950 to 1.7 % in 1958 so that, in ab-
solute and in relative terms, the range was markedly narrowing,
albeit by no means to an insignificant level (as, for example, in
1975). It is striking that - even at the time of the unemployment
peak in 1950 - the state of Baden-Wiirttemberg came quite close to
what may be regarded as full employment.
The regional disparity of the jobless rate in the fifties reflects
the well-known fact that the unemployment of the time was closely
linked to the problem of absorbing the refugees (or expellees)
from Germany's eastern provinces. For simple geographical reasons,
these refugees were cramped into the rural areas of the north-east
(Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony) and the south-east (Bavaria) of
West Germany, with the share of refugees in the number of unem-
ployed ranging in 1950 from 56.8 % in Schleswig-Holstein to 41.3 %
in Lower Saxony and 39.3 % in Bavaria, significantly above the
national average of 33.4 %. Table 3 shows that - parallel to the
general decline of the unemployment rate and parallel to the re-
duction of regional disparities - the "refugee unemployment prob-
lem" lost its dramatic dimension and part of its peculiar regional
component. The average share of refugees in the number of unem-
ployed gradually declined from 33.4 % in 1950 to 26.3 % in 1954
and 22 % in 1958, which came close to a state of normality, with
the refugees' share in unemployment only slightly surpassing their
share in the population (about 18 %). In the same period, the co-
efficient of variation across states declined from 0.46 to 0.34,
with the maximum share moving down from 56.8 % to 35.2 % and the
minimum share rising from 2.4 % to 7.8 %.
How did this remarkably fast reduction and regional adjustment of
unemployment in general and of the unemployed refugees in particu-
lar come about? As to the reduction, through an exceptionally rap-
id growth of overall employment which - in all the years from 1950
to 1957 - surpassed the growth of the labour force. As can be
seen from Table 4, employment grew at an average annual rate of
4 % from 1950 to 1954 and of 3.7 % from 1954 to 1958, while the- 5 -
Table 3: Share of Refugees in the Number of Unemployed and its
Interregional Dispersion












































•Calculated as weighted mean (weighted standard deviation) with the
share of a state's number of unemployed in the total number .of un-
employed in West Germany as weight; figures exclude Saarland and
Berlin.
Source: own calculations with data from Bundesministerium fur Ar-
beit (since 1953: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), Jahreszahlen
zur Arbeitsstatistik, various issues.











































•Calculated as weighted mean (weighted standard deviation) with the
share of a state's labour force (employment) in total labour force
(total employment) in Germany 1950 (1954 ) as weight.
Source: own calculations with data from Bundesministerium fur Arbeit
(since 1953: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), Jahreszahlen zur Ar-
beitsstatistik, various issues.- 6 -
labour force grew at rates of 3.1 % and 2.8 % respectively. As to
regional adjustment, the interstate variation of both growth rates
gives some clue: from 1950 to 1954, the regional disparity of the
average annual labour force growth rates - ranging from +4.9 % in
North Rhine-Westfalia to -2.3 % in Schleswig-Holstein yielding a
coefficient of variation of 0.65 - indicates a substantial reshuf-
fling of the labour force away from the rural states to the indus-
trial centers in North Rhine-Westf alia and Baden-Wiirttemberg,
where employment grew at average annual rates around 5 % compared
to 1 % in Schleswig-Holstein and 2.6-2.7 % in Lower Saxony and Ba-
varia. This process of reshuffling labour slowed down significant-
ly during the second half of the period, with the coefficient of
variation of labour force growth declining to 0.25 and employment
growth converging to rates between 3.5 % and 4 % p.a.
A somewhat more complete picture of interregional adjustment can
be gained by examining the level and pattern of migration (Table
5). The migration quota - defined as the number of migration cases
within West Germany as a percentage of the West German population
- indicates that, all throughout the period 1950-58, the level of
migration was higher than in recent years; within the fifties, the
differences were small, with migration reaching its peak in,1953.
Qualitatively the same conclusions emerge when looking separately
at intrastate and interstate migration (columns 2 and 3).
A migration quota measures something like an aggregate propensity
to migrate; it lumps together what may be called random and sys-
tematic interstate migration. Broadly speaking, random interstate
migration may be defined as the part of migration which yields
migration account balance between any state and the rest of the
country, and systematic migration as the part which leads to posi-
tive or negative migration accounts. As to the movement of refu-
gees from the rural areas to the industrial centers, it is system-
atic migration which concerns us here. Comparing the maximum and
the minimum state quotas in any year indicates that this kind of
systematic migration seems to have somewhat declined in the course- 7 -
Table 5: Level and Interregional Dispersion of Migration











































































































(1) Number of intranational (i.e. intrastate plus interstate) mi-
gration cases as a percentage of the West German population
(2) Number of intrastate migration cases as a percentage of the
West German population
(3) Defined as ZTM./P, with M. being the number of immigration
cases in state i
1and P being the size of the German population
(4) Defined as 0.5 •£ |M.-E.|/P, with M.-E. being the balance of
immigration (M.) and
1emigration (E.t cases in state i and P
being the size
1 of the West German
1population
(5) Defined as Max (M.-E.)/P., with M.-E. defined as in footnote 4 iii ii and P. being the size of the population in state i
(6) Defined as Min (M.-E.)/P., with M.-E. and P. defined as in
footnotes 4 and 5 respectively
Source: own calculations with data from Statistisches Bundesamt,
Wirtschaft und Statistik; data for 1950-58 exclude, data
for 1975-84 include Saarland and Berlin.- 8 -
of the fifties. This conjecture finds support in the development
of the net interstate migration quota, broadly speaking defined as
the sum of all immigration balances (in absolute terms) divided by
the population of the country. As can be seen from Table 5, this
quota declines from 0.8 in 1950 to 0.1 in 1958, which is the level
of later years. Hence, we may conclude that the fifties were a
period of a comparatively high mobility and intense migration
which gradually changed its character from being a systematic
movement from the rural to the industrial states into a more ran-
dom process. All this can be taken as evidence for a gradual
equalization of economic conditions in post-war West Germany and
for a fairly rapid integration of refugees.
As to the unemployed refugees, there was not only a regional, but
also a significant occupational mismatch of labour supply and po-
tential labour demand in the early fifties. Due to the pre-war
predominance of agriculture and certain - mostly light - indus-
tries in the former eastern provinces of Germany, the refugees
made up a disproportionately large chunk of unemployment among
agricultural, forestry, glass, stone, ceramics and textile workers
(in 1950 together about 45.1 %), far above the national average of
34.1 % in 1950. Again, the adjustment was fast: by 1958, the share
had come down to 22.1 %, fairly close to the national average of
19.5 %. In a somewhat more comprehensive manner, this structural
adjustment can be recognized in Table 6, which depicts various
measures for the dispersion of the share of refugees in unemploy-
ment in 1950, 1954 and 1958 across 33 occupations. As the decline
of the coefficient of variation from 1950 to 1958 indicates, there
was a marked convergence towards the mean, with the adjustment
being most pronounced in the first half of the period. Again, this
can be taken as evidence for a high degree of mobility of the ref-
ugees, this time between occupations.
Besides the integration of the refugees and - closely connected to
it - the temporary regional and occupational mismatch sketched
above, there was no serious structural problem of the labour mar-
ket in the fifties. With regard to sex, it is worth noting that- 9 -
Table 6: Share of Refugees in the Number of Unemployed
in 33 Occupational Groups*






























•Measured at the end of the month
••Calculated as weighted mean (weighted standard deviation) with the
share of an occupation's number of unemployed in the total number
of unemployed in West Germany as weight; figures exclude Saarland
and Berlin
Source: own calculations with data from Bundesministerium fur Arbeit
(since 1953: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), Jahreszahlen zur Ar-
beitsstatistik, various issues.
Table 7: Growth of Employment and its Dispersion acrqss 32 Sectors
Period Average Annual Growth Rate across Sectors
Mean* Standard Coefficient Maximum Minimum
(p.c.) Deviation* of (p.c.) (p.c.)
(p.c.) Variation
I: 6/46-6/48 +10.7 9.7 ' 0.91 +46.1 - 6.8
II: 6/48-6/50 + 6.5 9.9 1.52 +32.6 -20.5
III: 6/50-9/58 + 4.2 3.9 0.93 +10.8 - 5.8
•Calculated as weighted mean (weighted standard deviation) with the
share of a sector's employment in total employment in West Germany at
the beginning of period I (II, III) as weight
Source: own calculations with data from Bundesministerium fur Arbeit
(since 1953: Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit), Jahreszahlen zur Ar-
beitsstatistik, various issues; Statistisches Bundesamt:
Wirtschaft und Statistik, various issues.- 10 -
all throughout the period 1950-58 women by far outpaced men in
labour force growth (average annual rates of 4.6 % versus 2.2 %)
and in employment growth (rates of 5.5 % versus 3.1 %). Apparent-
ly, many women started to supply labour pari passu with general
economic conditions improving so that a considerable "quiet re-
serve" ("Stille Reserve") was gradually activated. As female em-
ployment growth lagged somewhat behind female labour force growth,
the unemployment rate of women was most of the time slightly high-
er than the unemployment rate of men; except for one year (1955),
however, the difference was never larger than one percentage
point.
Table 7 r6unds off the picture of the post-war German labour mar-
ket up to 1958 by presenting the growth rates of sector specific
employment in three sub-periods, namely the time before the cur-
rency reform (I), the time from the currency reform to the onset
of the Korea boom which was also the period of peak unemployment
(II), and the time during and after the Korea boom (III). At an
average annual growth rate of 10.7 %, overall employment growth
was spectacular in the first period, which is commonly looked upon
as a time of somewhat chaotic economic development within an un-
sound monetary framework. Despite the marked rise in unemployment
after the currency reform, the second period still exhibited a
rapid growth of employment which was, however, outpaced by an even
more rapid growth of the labour force. Employment growth in the
third period came closer to normal dimensions, although, by most
historical standards, it was extraordinarily fast.
While the level of employment grew fast, the sectoral structure of
employment changed significantly in all three periods. The coeffi-
cient of variation of the growth rates across 32 sectors (includ-
ing agriculture, mining, all industries and services) is slightly
below one for the first and third period and even above one for
the second period. Looking at the growth pattern of particular
industries in the three periods, it becomes obvious that the
structural shifts taking place before the currency reform were
quite different from those in the two later periods: before the
currency reform, the top winners in the growth race were mostly- 11 -
consumer goods industries, like textiles and clothing, musical
instruments, toys, and entertainment; in contrast, the picture of
the second and the third periods is dominated by the overpropor-
tionate growth of investment goods industries, like iron and
steel, metal manufacturing and vehicles as well as the growth of
services. More technically, it can be shown that the ranking of
the 32 sector growth rates in the first period hardly correlates
at all with the ranking of either later period: Spearman's rank
correlation coefficient (r) turns out to be 0.16 for periods I and
II, and 0.13 for periods I and III. In contrast, the correlation
between the respective rankings of the two later periods is sig-
nificant, albeit still far from perfect (r = 0.45). These statis-
tical measures indicate that the structural shifts before the cur-
rency reform may have been much more the product of chance and
casual circumstances like the heavy control by the occupation au-
thorities than of viable long-term market forces. Only the pro-
nounced shift away from agriculture, which had negative growth
rates all throughout, stands out as a common feature of all three
periods.
3. The Cause of Unemployment
Among German economists of the early fifties, there was no real
disagreement about the main cause of unemployment: a severe short-
age of capital. In a somewhat modernized terminology, the average
capital shortage story of the time may be told as follows.
Right after the war, Germany found herself with a good part of her
capital destroyed or at least damaged through bombing raids and
her population dramatically increased through the influx of refu-
gees. Until the currency reform, this abrupt shift of factor en-
dowments did not push up the jobless rate simply because industri-
al and agricultural employers could well afford to pay wages in an
almost worthless currency. In the overcrowded rural states of the
north- and southeast, many refugees began to work on farms, so as
to secure a bare minimum of subsistence; most probably, their mar-- 12 -
ginal product was extremely low - if not negative - so that em-
ploying them came close to being a charitable act of the farmers.
As earning money had a low survival value compared to black-market
activities, the work discipline was bad and absenteeism very com-
mon in the official (i.e., money wage) part of the economy. Hence,
there was a hardly quantifiable, but certainly substantial hidden
unemployment spread all across the country. All this changed with
the currency reform, which swept away the monetary distortion from
the employers' profit-maximising calculus, thus revealing the real
extent of the capital gap: with fixed proportions of capital and
labour prevailing in the short run and capital being the con-
straint, industrial firms had to lay off part of their labour
force; similarly in agriculture, where the short run potential of
substituting labour for capital had already been stretched to its
physical limits. As agriculture had absorbed most of the refugees
in the first place, the readjustment to normalized economic condi-
tions quite naturally led to a marked regional disparity of unem-
ployment between the rural and the industrial regions. With prof-
its at a high and wages at a miserably low level, the only feasi-
ble medium run solution to the unemployment problem appeared to be
a rapid and sustained growth of the capital stock combined with a
movement of abundant labour away from the rural areas to the in-
dustrial centers where the marginal efficiency of capital was
highest due to the enormous physical productivity of repair and
modernisation investments in existing plants
This story yields a very plausible explanation for the unemploy-
ment in the first post-war decade. It also finds considerable sup-
port in estimates of different types of unemployment which were
carried out at various times between 1949 and 1954 (Table 8). The
share of so-called structural unemployment was unambiguously esti-
This kind of reasoning can be found in many academic publica-
tions on the matter, be they written by Keynesians or Ordo-
liberals. See e.g. Arbeitsgemeinschaft ... (1950), pp.6f;
Quante (1950), p.385; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundes-
ministerium fur Wirtschaft, Reports of February 26, 1950, para
7-12 and, with some provisos concerning the almost exclusive
preoccupation with capital shortage, Ropke (1950) pp.38ff.Bibliothek
S Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
- 13 -
Table 8: Estimates of Different Types of Unemployment
\ year


























































Source: for 12/49: Ehret (1959), p. 103; for 2/50: Barnikel (1959),
p. 70 based on Wagenfuhr (1950), p. 80; for 6/52: Bundesmini-
sterium fur Arbeit (1952), Analyse der westdeutschen Arbeits-
losigkeit, p. 13 (figure for seasonal unemployment calculated
as residuum); for 9/54: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt
fur Arbeit, 2. Jg., Nr. 11 (vom 25.11.1954), p. 717,- 14 -
mated to be above 50 %. Thereby, the term "structural" does not
literally mean a mismatch between actual labour supply and actual
labour demand with the effective constraint on employment being
the mobility of the labour force between regions, sectors or occu-
pations but rather a - mostly regional - mismatch of actual labour
supply and a potential labour demand, which would be forthcoming
if sufficient capital were available, with the effective con-
straint being not mobility, but capital shortage. Thus interpret-
ed, structural unemployment is identical to capital shortage unem-
ployment as defined above. The table further shows that, even at
the peak of the unemployment problem in 1949/50, the business cy-
cle share of unemployment did not exceed 20 %, thus remaining far
below the share of structural unemployment.
Factor prices - notably the wage rate - played virtually no role
2) in the contemporaneous diagnosis of unemployment . The wage level
was simply considered to be extremely low, although, by interna-
tional standards, it did not fare as badly as one might expect in
a war-damaged economy: denoted in dollars at the official exchange
rate, the average hourly wage of an industrial worker in 1950 was
$0.30 in Germany compared to $1.45 in the United States, $0.45 in
the United Kingdom, $0.23 in France and $0.22 in Italy . Of
course, such calculations must be taken with extreme caution since
hefty exchange rate adjustments in the late forties (devaluations
of the British pound and the French franc) may distort the pic-
ture; however, they do broadly indicate that there was at least no
huge wage gap between West Germany and major continental coun-
tries. Still then, profits in general and retained earnings in
particular were quite high in 1949/50, so that one may be justi-
2. The remarkable exception is Ropke (1950), who mentions the
wage level being out of line with marginal productivity as a
possible explanation for at least some unemployment (p.45f).
However, he does not elaborate on the point, and the main
thrust of his argument falls within the sphere of capital
shortage, including the problem of "structural adjustment"
(p.44ff).
3. Own calculations on basis of data from "The Economist", Eco-
nomic Statistics 1900-1983, Part III.- 15 -
fied in discarding the wage level as a likely cause of unemploy-
ment at the beginning of the period (except, of course, in the
trivial sense that there is always a general equilibrium wage at
however low a level as long as the production function allows for
some substitution of labour for capital). In later years, the sit-
uation was probably not much different (Table 9): in the period
1950-54, the wage level rose at around 7.5 % p.a., but this rise
was more than matched by the combination of a labour productivity
increase of about 6 % p.a. (at rapidly growing employment!), a
rise of producer prices by almost 4 % p.a. and an improvement of
the terms of trade by about 5.5 % p.a., so that, in efficiency
terms, the pressure of labour costs is likely to have eased. This
changed in the period 1954-58, when productivity growth, producer
price inflation and the terms of trade improvement all slowed down
while nominal wage pressure was held up at about the same annual
growth rate as before. In that period, however, productivity
growth was kept low precisely because employment was rising so
rapidly, and one may conjecture that - at a given employment level
- the productivity advance did suffice to more than compensate
employers for wage rises; even if there still was a profit squeeze
through wage demands, the numbers in Table 9 suggest that it did
not reach dimensions which could have been a serious brake on em-
ployment expansion.
The capital shortage story neglected not only the wage level, but
also the regional wage structure as a possible determinant of un-
employment. This was analytically justified as long as the argu-
ment was intended to be short-run, with industry assumed to pro-
duce with a fixed coefficient technology at a given capital stock.
Taking a longer run view, however, a wage differentiation in line
with the regional extent of labour abundance may well have served
as a means of facilitating the adjustment process by raising the
marginal efficiency of capital in the overcrowded rural areas and
thus attracting capital to these regions instead of merely relying
on the movement of labour. Such a development program for the
backward regions ("Notstandsgebiete") on the basis of regional
factor price differentiation was apparently outside the realm of- 16 -
Table 9: Average Annual Growth Rates of Industrial Wages,

































Source: own calculations with data of Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirt-
schaft und Statistik, various issues; Bank for International
Settlements, Germany - Monetary and Economic Situation 1950-
1959, Basle 1959.
Table 10: Interregional Dispersion of Wages in Industry*








•For.: 6/48 measured at the end of the month; for 1950-B5 annual
averages.
••Calculated as weighted mean (weighted standard deviation) with
the share of a state's industrial employment in West Germany
as weight; from 6/48 to 1958 excluding, from 1975 to 1980 in-
cluding Saarland and Berlin.
Source: own calculations with data from Statistisches Bundesamt,































academic discourse at the time '. Nor did it materialize in prac-
tice, as the numbers in Table 10 indicate: the regional differen-
tiation of effective wages in industry was small relative to the
wage level, with the coefficients of variation being below 0.10.
In this respect, the fifties were no different from more recent
times.
To summarize, the diagnosis of capital shortage did, no doubt,
focus on the most relevant aspect of German economic redevelopment
at the time. By leaving wages out of the explanatory picture, it
did not miss a major cause of unemployment; however, it may have
obstructed the policians
1 view to an alternative paradigm which
might have been most fruitful in an economic policy debate about
the sharing of the adjustment burden between capital and labour.
4. The Cure for Unemployment
As mentioned above, the consensus on the cause of unemployment did
not entail an agreement on cures to be applied. With rising unem-
ployment in 1949, matters of full employment policy began to re-
place matters of liberalisation as priority items on the agenda of
academic economists and policy makers. Up to the balance of pay-
ments crisis in the fall of 1950, unemployment remained the major
topic of the policy debate. At no time later in the fifties did it
reappear on the economic policy agenda with comparable vigour and
urgency. Hence, not surprisingly, the most important statements of
prominent economists about full employment policy were made at
4. In its report of September 24, 1950, the Council of Academic
Economists at the Ministry of Economic Affairs concludes its
argument in favour of a rise in wages with the statement that
a regional, sectoral and occupational differentiation of wages
does, in fact, improve the employment opportunities for labour
and the locational conditions for entrepreneurs (para 14,
p.91). However, the point is made just once and h6t further
elaborated. As the Council followed the practice of commenting
its main points carefully and repeating, them in quite a few
reports, one may suspect that it was not a main point, but
rather an off-hand remark of minor importance.- 18 -
about the time of peak unemployment from, say, spring 1949 to fall
1950. No attempt will be made to summarize and evaluate the host
of complementary and conflicting views put forward in numerous
public speeches, memoranda and articles of the quality press. In-
stead, we shall pick out three paradigmatic positions which played
a major part in the policy debate as particularly well argued
cases based on different conceptions of the role of government,
namely
(a) the Keynesian position as presented by Erich Preiser and the
working group of the German Economic Research Institutes, with
Fritz Baade of the Institute of World Economics as its intel-
lectual pace-maker;
(b) the dogmatic liberal position as presented by Wilhelm Ropke;
(c) the pragmatic liberal position as presented by the Advisory
Council of Academic Economists ("Wissenschaftlicher Beirat") at
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, with members including outspo-
ken Keynesians: Erich Preiser, Karl Schiller and Otto Veit, as
well as outspoken ordoliberals: Franz Bohm, Walter Eucken, Leon-
hard Miksch and Alfred Miiller-Armack.
In the following, these three positions will be briefly summariz-
ed, juxtaposed and evaluated to the extent that they had
implications for the central policy question whether and how the
capital shortage could be overcome by government action.
To (a): The Keynesian Position
German Keynesians usually pleaded for a combination of three meas-
ures: expansionary monetary policy, special tax incentives for
saving and - to some extent- investment planning ("Investitions-
lenkung"). The macroeconomic part of their argument - as most co-
gently put forward by Preiser (1950) - ran as follows:
5. Similar arguments were made by Quante (1950) and Schiller
(1951) in a paper presented at the meeting of the "Verein fur
Socialpolitik" in Bad Pyrmont, October 1950.- 19 -
Additional investment is needed to overcome the capital shortage.
There are two ways of financing this investment at a given level
of production and income: through an increase in current saving at
the cost of current consumption - the classical way - or through
money creation - the Keynesian way. The classical variant has the
drawback that, be it through an increase of taxation or a rise of
the interest rate, it entails a mere shift of aggregate demand
away from consumption to investment, but no change of its level.
As, in a state of unemployment equilibrium, production and income
are determined by aggregate demand, there will be no change in
income and hence no secondary effects on consumption and saving,
in short: no self-perpetuating multiplier process which may move
the economy closer to full employment. The capital shortage will
only be reduced to the extent of the initial cut of consumption,
no matter how this cut came about. Not so in the Keynesian vari-
ant: as the initial investment is financed through money creation,
there will be no reduction of consumption either through higher
taxation or through a rise of the interest rate. In unemployment
equilibrium, income will rise by the amount of additional invest-
ment; thus an expansionary multiplier process is set in motion
which leads to income induced increases in both saving and con-
sumption. As the induced consumption demand meets a supply which
is price inelastic in the short run, prices and - at given nominal
wages - profits in the consumption goods industries will rise. If
the process is now left to itself (without further monetary ali-
mentation) the outcome will be that the original investment is
eventually financed through an income induced rise in (voluntary)
saving by private households and through a consumption induced
rise of profits and thus retained earnings in the consumer goods
industries. Hence, the multiplier process ends up financing it-
self, albeit at the cost of price inflation in the consumer goods
industries. However, this cost can be avoided if the expansionary
monetary policy is combined with the introduction of a system of
tax incentives for saving which is precisely targeted at skimming
off the consumer demand push resulting from the investment induced
income expansion. Of course, such a policy cuts off all secondary
effects of the multiplier process by preventing consumption to- 20 -
rise with income so that the overall expansion just equals the
original increase in investment, i.e. the investment multiplier
equals one, a result which parallels the celebrated Haavelmo-
Theorem of a unitary balanced budget multiplier. Only by starting
another round of money financed investment can - and should - the
expansionary effect be perpetuated. When looking upon an infinite
sequence of such policy measures, the logical structure of this
line of reasoning becomes evident: today's investment - pre-fi-
nanced through money creation - is post-financed through tomor-
row's income induced (and tax privileged, i.e. subsidized!) sav-
ing; with investment - temporarily financed through money creation
- always running ahead of saving, the expansion is perpetuated.
The analytical difference between a Keynesian policy without and a
Keynesian policy with tax privileges for saving is obvious: with-
out the privileges, investment is at least partly post-financed
through an (involuntary) inflation tax on consumers; with tax
privileges, it is exclusively post-financed through voluntary (but
note: subsidized) saving. As Preiser and other Keynesians empha-
sized, it was precisely this quality of raising voluntary saving
ex-post and thus avoiding inflation which made this peculiar pol-
icy mix so attractive for West Germany at a time when the classi-
cal variant of saving through consumption restraint was neither
effective nor feasible since the propensity to consume appeared to
be extremely high, and the conventional Keynesian variant of
forced saving carried with it the danger of initiating an infla-
tionary spiral with all its negative consequences for external
stability.
Apart from their macroeconomic argument for monetary expansion and
tax reform, Keynesians made a strong welfare economic case for
planning : major growth bottlenecks, above all in housing and
transportation, could easily be recognized, but not easily be bro-
ken without government interference since the private rate of re-
6. See e.g. Arbeitsgemeinschaft ... (1950), Ch.ll and, somewhat
less dogmatically, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesmini-
sterium der Finanzen, Report of June 25, 1950, para 6.- 21 -
turn in these bottleneck fields was apparently too low to attract
a socially efficient amount of capital. In addition, the German
capital market was extremely narrow so that the process of chan-
nelling business savings (profits) out of self-financing invest-
ment in own plant and equipment into socially efficient lines of
production was seriously constrained anyway. Hence, extensive gov-
ernment intervention was required both in the shape of direct pub-
lic investment to break bottlenecks, and in the shape of a tax
reform aimed at promoting private investment in social bottleneck
fields and improving the efficiency of capital markets by removing
overdrawn tax privileges for self-financing.
To (b): The Dogmatic Liberal Position
Even among liberal economists, Wilhelm R6pke was alone in making, a
clear-cut case for higher interest rates as a necessary step to-
wards overcoming the capital shortage (Ropke, 1950, Ch.8). His
argument followed straight neoclassical lines. By definition, a
capital shortage can only be overcome through saving, be it forced
or voluntary. Variants of forced saving are outright taxation,
open inflation, which, raises, business profits (retained earnings)
at the cost of real wages, or surpressed inflation (through price
controls) which leads to a quantitative rationing of consumption
demand. While outright taxation might be justified in very narrow
limits to finance public investments in carefully selected fields,
the other two variants were simply unaccaptable in a country :like
Germany, with its record of disastrous inflation and its more re-
cent experience of central planning ("Bewirtschaftung"). Variants
of voluntary saving include genuine household and business saving
out of current income as well as capital imports. Extensive busi-
ness saving through retained earnings had, in RSpke's view, the
drawback of distorting the allocation of capital in a country like
Germany, where the capital market was.still in its infancy; hence,
one should mostly rely on household savings.and capital imports.
As to households, Ropke recognized a genuine conflict between
their high time preference due to the long period of war and
after-war misery and the economy's urgent need of capital to se-- 22 -
cure full employment in the future. As the interest rate is basi-
cally the price of time - and not the price of liquidity - this
conflict of the (perfectly legitimate) demands of the present and
the future must be reconciled by a rise in the interest rate, even
if the price to be paid were a less than maximum, but nevertheless
intertemporarily optimal capital accumulation. Of course, a rise
of the interest rate to its equilibrium, or in Wicksellian terms:
to its natural level would necessarily reduce investment demand,
but it was by no means clear that this would also reduce the vol-
ume of realized investment since, at a less than equilibrium rate,
investment was supply constrained by saving, so that the level of
realized investment might well increase along with the positively
interest elastic supply of savings. Furthermore, the rise in the
interest rate would lead to a readjustment of the investment
structure towards the formation of capital with a particularly
high marginal efficiency, i.e. - in R6pke's empirical judgement
about 1950 Germany - those projects which satisfy demands in the
near future at the cost of those aimed at more distant times.
To summarize, it was the interest rate which Ropke regarded as the
main regulator of the intertemporal allocation of resources, and
not some supposedly objective criteria of urgency which directs
the decisions of some central planner. While R6pke was ready to
grant that, at the given level of heavy regulation and price con-
trols in certain capital markets (e.g. the housing market), a cer-
tain extent of corrective government intervention - including the
provision of tax privileges - was probably warranted so as to se-
cure enough new capital formation despite an artificially low mar-
ket rate of return; even then, he emphasized that government in-
tervention was only justified as a temporary emergency measure, to
be called off as soon as free market pricing was reestablished
which, at any rate, should happen as soon as possible. In this
sense, Ropke was highly critical of (Keynesian) attempts at gov-
ernment planning to break apparent bottlenecks; instead, he
strongly advocated the reestablishment of free and, as he assumed,
efficient capital markets in all fields, no matter how "visible"
and "urgent" the investment needs appeared to be.- 23 -
In the same vein, Ropke argued in favour of substituting private
foreign savings for official foreign aid, which was expected to be
cut back anyway. In his view, only a steadfast policy of economic
liberalisation was appropriate to regain the confidence of for-
eignors in German economic growth and thus allow the private capi-
tal inflow to increase and supplement domestic savings.
To (c): Pragmatic Liberal Position
If we interpret the Keynesian and the dogmatic liberal standpoints
as opposite ends in a spectrum of opinions about the scope of gov-
ernment intervention in the economy of Germany in 1950, we would
have to place the position of the Advisory Council of Academic
Economists at the Ministry of Economic Affairs somewhere in the
middle. In its main reports on unemployment, capital shortage and
expansionary monetary policy (reports of May 8, 1949, February 26,
1950 and June 10, 1950), the council struck a delicate balance
between Keynesian macro and neoclassical price theory.
In its statements on monetary and credit policy, the council by
and large followed Keynesian-type analysis, albeit with a pro-
nounced anti-inflationary undercurrent. In the report of May 8,
1949, the Council emphasized the need for moderate expansionary
open market operations, which should be accompanied by an active
market policy ("Marktpolitik") to cut down on monopolistic profit
margins, which were considered to be at least partly responsible
for too high a price level; increasing competition between indus-
trial producers would drive up productivity, thus allowing wages
and incomes to rise and, with appropriate tax incentives for
household saving, this rise could be transformed into an increase
of saving (not consumption).
Thirteen months later, in its report of June 10, 1950, the Council
fully endorsed Preiser's concept of pre-financing investment
through money creation. As a complement to the investment push,
the Council recommended creating the conditions for a more effi-
cient capital market. Unlike Ropke, however, the Council did not
go as far as making a case for free and, thus, presumably high- 24 -
interest rates; rather, it pleaded for tax incentives to saving
and a systematic reduction of bond price risk through open market
operations by the central bank ("Kurspflege") which, in plain
language, boils down to a policy of pegging the interest rate,
again a strongly Keynesian element.
In its main report on unemployment and capital shortage (February
26, 1950), the Council advocated credit expansion provided that -
after pre-financing investment - the complementary goods would be
forthcoming so as to avoid any inflationary pressure. The Council
also recommended introducing tax privileges for special forms of
saving ("Zwecksparen"), especially in the field of housing invest-
ment. In the same vein, it argued in favour of a general cut of
individual and corporate income taxation, with tax savings being
transformed into a compulsory loan ("Zwangsanleihe"), to be held
in the form of bonds or stocks; thereby, firms should not be al-
lowed to use their tax savings for additional self-finance except
in very narrowly defined circumstances. With respect to direct
labour market interventions, the report flatly rejected any kind
of rationing of the labour supply, be it through compulsory short-
time work, new public work programs ("Notstandsarbeit") or the
prohibition of holding more than one job at a time. However, gov-
ernment support to refugees and other disadvantaged labour market
groups was explicitly endorsed if the support was linked to active
labour market adjustments of the recipients and not just granted
as an unconditional rent.
To summarize, the major tune of the reports is a combination of
moderate credit expansion to pre-finance investment with no
Philipps-curve-type concession to inflation, of active tax policy
to encourage capital formation and to channel savings into bottle-
neck fields, and of a social policy to facilitate labour market
adjustment with no direct public work programs involved. The ideo-
logical picture of government which this tune conveys is that of a
public authority which is in principle liberal minded, but which
has at the same time the right and the duty to paternalistically
impose distortions on the price system so as to secure an adequate- 25 -
growth of the economy to the long-term benefit of all. It is a
highly pragmatic version of economic liberalism, far from a
socialist minded interventionism, but also far from any ideal of
laissez-faire.
From a strictly welfare theoretic point of view, it is R5pke's
dogmatic liberalism which, of the three positions sketched above,
provides the most convincing answer to the question of how to
overcome a serious capital shortage, namely through a rise in the
price of time: the interest rate. All other variants of increasing
saving entail at least some elements of coercion and distortion:
in the case of tax privileges for saving, the taxpayers are forced
to carry the burden of subsidizing (voluntary) saving; if the tax
privilege depends on the type of saving (e.g., housing loans), an
element of distortion is added. Of course, Keynesians and the
Council of Academic Economists were well aware of this almost
trivial point. It remains all the more striking that they did not
feel obliged to give more than prima facie evidence of capital
shortage to support their case and - even more importantly - to
seriously considejr the alternative of letting the interest rate
adjust to the observed scarcities. Clearly, the welfare economic
pillar of their argument was poorly developed; instead, somewhat
cruder notions of maximising growth and capital accumulation pre-
vailed.
As to macroeconomic theory, the essentially Keynesian line of rea-
soning as presented by Preiser and the Council of Academic Econo-
mists also had some serious analytical flaws: at no point did it
clearly distinguish between the stock demand for money (hoarding)
and the flow demand for savings, with, at given money supply, the
former having a deflationary effect on aggregate demand and the
latter having no effect at all as long as the velocity of money
and, hence, the money demand remains constant. In their analysis,
it is simply assumed that an increase in consumption demand does
raise prices while an increase in saving (and thus investment de-
mand) does not. In our view, it is the stock demand for money and
the price elasticity of aggregate goods supply, not a trade-off- 26 -
between saving and consumption, which eventually determine whether
a monetary expansion leads into more real economic activity or
more inflation. True, by expanding the aggregate production capac-
ity of the economy, investment does - and consumption does not -
increase future goods supply, but this is a medium- or long-run
effect which may not prevent immediate inflationary pressures from
emerging; at any rate, it is not discussed by the proponents of
Preiser's concept of monetary expansion and income induced saving.
Politically, the pragmatic liberal and, to some extent, the
Keynesian ideas did have distinctive advantages over Ropke's more
radical line: they conveyed the picture of an active government
which did not only recognize the capital shortage, but also did
something about it. To let market forces run their merciless
course without any substantial policy commitments by the public
authorities might have overstretched the readiness of the popula-
tion to adjust to economic conditions which were harsh enough any-
way. Given this kind of political constraint on any conception of
economic policy, the pragmatic position of the Council of Academic
Economists at the Ministry of Economic Affairs deserves much cred-
it as a remarkably liberal stance which made its most far-reaching
compromises with less liberal policy conceptions precisely in that
field where they were likely to hurt least: in the field of pro-
moting capital formation for future growth.
5. Economic Policy in 1949/50
Early in 1950, the public discussion about appropriate economic
policies to reduce unemployment reached its political climax with
the memorandum of the Allied High Commission which called for ex-
pansionary measures including a more aggressive monetary and cred-
it policy . The West German government replied by restating its
capital-shortage diagnosis of unemployment and listing all the
7. See "Die Neue Zeitung" of February 20, 1950, No.43.- 27 -
policy measures which the government had already undertaken.or
8) intended to undertake in the following months . Actually, there
were three genuine public employment programs at the period of
peak unemployment in 1949/50: a program to finance particular in-
vestment as well as export projects (volume: DM 0.3 billion)
started in August 1949, a work-creation program (volume: DM 0.9
billion) and a housing program (volume: DM 2.6 billion), both ini-
tiated right after the "Memorandum War" between the Allied High
Commission and the German government. In all these programs, a
short-run expansionary effect was expected from a pre-financing
commitment of the central bank. As a matter of fact, the extent of
pre-financing of these three programs together remained well below
DM 1 billion all throughout the year 1950, with the bulk of the
more important work-creation and housing programs carried out in
the fall of 1950 when the Korea-boom and the subsequent balance of
payments crisis had set, in; in any case, the programs did hot
9)
amount to more than 3 % of aggregate gross investment in 1950 .
Apart from the pre-financing schemes, the expansionary measures of
the central bank in the years 1949 and 1950 were moderate by any
conventional standard. In the second quarter of 1949, the discount
rate was cut from 5 to 4 %, where it stayed until balance of pay-
ments considerations in the. fall of 1950 led to a rise to 6 %. In
addition, credit ceilings were lifted in March 1949, restrictions
on the rediscounting of acceptances were removed in May 1949, and
reserve requirements were reduced in July and September 1949
It is noteworthy that all these monetary measures were taken long
before the High Commission issued its famous memorandum; hence,
the:only significant policy answer to the Allied warnings appears
to be the initiation of the work-creation and the housing pro-
grams, no doubt a modest political yield which shows that, on bal-
ance, the German government was the winner of the memorandum war.
8. See "Die Neue Zeitung" of March 6, 1950, No.55.
9. For the data, see Bank deutscher Lander (1950), p.27, Table 6
and Wallich (1955), p.156, Table 16.;
10. See Wallich (1955), p.84f.- 28 -
In summary, one can hardly escape the conclusion that the macro-
economic policies of the German government and the central bank at
the time of peak unemployment must have been very disappointing
for all Keynesian economists who had called for more expansionary
measures.
As described above, Keynesians and pragmatic liberals favoured tax
incentives for saving, and virtually every economist made a case
for a more efficient capital market to overcome the capital
shortage. At the time of peak unemployment in the winter 1949/50,
there already existed a long array of tax privileges for various
forms of private capital formation which had all been introduced
in the Tax Law Adjustment Acts of June 1948 and April 1949, so as
to prevent the very high income tax rates fixed by the Allied
authorities from stifling the work and saving motivation of the
population. The privileges included accelerated depreciation al-
lowances for capital expenditures incurred in repairing war-
damaged equipment (para 7 (a) of the Income Tax Law), for new res-
idential property (para 7 (b)) and for new industrial, commercial
and agricultural plants (para 7 (e)), tax deductions for housing
loans (para 7 (c)), shipbuilding loans (para 7 (d)) and special
forms of saving, such as life insurance premiums and contributions
to building societies (para 10). In 1950, the total amount deduct-
ed from individual and corporate income tax according to para 7
(a)-(e) of the Income Tax Law was about DM 0.9 billion, i.e. 4.2 %
of the aggregate gross income of all individual and corporate tax
returns; 48 % of this amount was due to para 7 (a), about 30 % to
para 7 (c) . These numbers suggest that the tax privileges had
much importance for capital formation; however, as they were de-
signed and implemented before unemployment reached its most
threatening dimension (i.e. before mid-1949), they can hardly be
regarded as a conscious political answer to the unemployment prob-
lem. Parallel to the cuts of marginal tax rates in later years,
11. Own calculations on the basis of data from Statistisches
Bundesamt, Einkommen- und KSrperschaftsteuerstatistik 1950,
pp.22, 35, 59, 66.- 29 -
the privileges were even partly removed or restricted in applic-
ability. Nor was there any speeded-up effort in 1950 to raise the
efficiency of capital markets; in fact, a law with this explicit
aim was passed as late as December 1952, when the unemployment
problem had already lost a good deal of its acuteness.
All these facts convey the impression that the government did not
really see the need for taking any exceptional steps to reduce
unemployment. True, there were quite a few laws passed in 1949/50
which did have immediate relevance for the labour market, e.g. the
resettlement orders of November 1949 demanding an organised reset-
tlement of 300,000 refugees from Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony
and Bavaria to other states, the first housing law of April 1950,
providing a legal framework for government intervention in the
housing market, and the many laws on welfare matters. However,
this legislation was based much more on medium- and long-term vi-
sions of economic growth and social equity than on short-term con-
siderations of full employment. After the main economic switches
had been shifted in 1948 and 1949 towards capital formation, the
government was apparently ready to sit back and watch the capital
stock growing. As far as mere numbers can prove anything, the rap-
id growth of gross capital formation between 1950 and 1958 at an
average annual rate of 9.4 % (as compared, e.g., to 4.8 % in the
12)
United Kingdom and 5.9 % in France) and the parallel rapid de-
cline of unemployment did prove this attitude to be justified.
12. Own calculations based on data from "The Economist", Economic
Statistics 1900-1983, Part III.- 30 -
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